Supermarket Human Resource Practices and Competition from Mass Merchandisers by Davis, Elizabeth et al.
 
 
 
 
INDUSTRY STUDIES ASSOCATION 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
Supermarket Human Resource Practices and Competition from Mass Merchandisers 
 
By 
 
Elizabeth Davis 
Food Industry Center 
University of Minnesota 
Minneapolis, MN 55414 
 
Matthew Freedman 
University of Maryland 
College Park, MD 20742 
 
Julia Lane 
Director, Economics, Labor and Population Department 
NORC, University of Chicago 
Chicago, IL 60637 
 
Brian McCall 
Food Industry Center 
University of Minnesota 
Minneapolis, MN 55414 
 
Nicole Nestoriak 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
US Department of Commerce 
Washington, DC 20230 
 
Timothy Park 
Food Industry Center 
University of Georgia 
Athens, GA 30602 
 
 
 
 
2005 
Industry Studies Association 
Working Papers 
 
WP-2005-12 
http://isapapers.pitt.edu/ 
 
 
 
Supermarket Human Resource Practices  
and Competition from Mass Merchandisers 
 
 
 
Elizabeth E. Davis 
Matthew Freedman 
Julia Lane 
Brian McCall 
Nicole Nestoriak 
Timothy Park 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The rise of supercenters and the entry of Wal-Mart into food retailing have dramatically 
altered the competitive environment in the industry. This paper explores the impact of 
such changes on the labor market practices of traditional food retailers. We use 
longitudinal data on workers and firms to construct new measures of compensation and 
employment, and examine how these measures evolve within and across firms in 
response to changes in product market competition. An additional feature of the analysis 
is to combine rich case study knowledge about the retail food industry with the new 
matched employer-employee data from the Census Bureau. We compare a set of human 
resource practices using measures based on the matched employer-employee data to an 
index based on survey data and case studies. The consistency between the two 
approaches suggests that the measures are capturing important differences in supermarket 
human resource practices and policies. Analysis of administrative data combined with 
case study observations strengthens our understanding of the diversity of human resource 
practices in the retail food industry. 
 
 
Earlier versions of this paper have benefited from helpful comments from Charlie Brown, 
Erica Groshen, James Hertel, Jean Kinsey, Anne Russell, and Scott Scheuler. This 
research uses confidential data from the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics Program (LEHD), which is partially supported by the National 
Science Foundation Grant SES-9978093 to Cornell University (Cornell Institute for 
Social and Economic Research), the National Institute on Aging, and the Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation. Disclaimer: The analysis presented here has undergone a more limited 
review than an official Census Bureau publication. The views expressed are attributable 
only to the authors and do not represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, program sponsors or the data providers.  
 
Introduction 
In recent years, much public concern has been raised about whether industrial re-
structuring has resulted in the creation of more “bad jobs” in the U.S. Critics have argued 
that employers have changed long-standing practices regarding the terms of employment 
and the way wages are set. The fear is that there are fewer jobs that offer a traditional 
long-term employment relationship and, at the same time, there are more low-skilled jobs 
with high rates of turnover and little opportunity for training and wage advancement. And 
some empirical evidence suggests that for workers with less education and few skills, the 
opportunities for advancement through job ladders are dwindling (Bernhardt et al., 2001).  
The objective of this paper is to use a new, very detailed, dataset to examine the impact 
of restructuring on human resource practices in the retail food industry.  
The retail food industry is, in many ways, an ideal industry for such a study. 
Although the retail sector of the economy has always had a relatively flat job hierarchy, 
supermarket jobs were once among the most highly paid and highly coveted retail jobs. 
However, over time, this feature of the industry has changed, and the typical supermarket 
job is no longer a full-time, relatively well paid position (often unionized), but rather a 
part-time job with irregular hours, low pay, and limited options for training or promotion.  
This has occurred at the same time that the industry has undergone massive product 
market restructuring, as Wal-Mart and other mass merchandisers have entered the 
industry. Indeed, Wal-Mart is now the largest food retailer in the U.S. with its share of 
the grocery market estimated to be close to 20%, having expanded from only ten 
supercenters in 1993 to over 1,866 supercenters by 2005. 
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In this paper we directly examine the relationship between growing competition from 
mass merchandisers like Wal-Mart and changes in human resources practices within the 
industry. While case study evidence suggests that the proliferation of big box stores has had a 
substantial impact on the labor market, most empirical studies to date have focused on the 
changes in county-level employment and wages that occur after Wal-Mart entry (for 
example, Basker, 2005 and Neumark, Zhang and Ciccarella, 2005). There has been no large 
scale dataset available on both firms and workers that could be used to describe human 
resource practices at the firm level. In this study we exploit a new dataset that permits us to 
analyze changes in supermarket hiring, promotion, pay and turnover policies at the 
establishment level in response to entry of mass merchandisers in the local market. We 
particularly focus on the role of firm entry and exit, since such policies have been linked to 
firm performance and survival (Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer, 2006). 
Background and Motivation  
Measurement of shifts in human resource practices of food retailers in response to 
changing product market competition is a challenge. Some guidance is provided by 
Lazear and Oyer (2004), who use measures of promotion, hiring, and wage setting to 
capture key aspects of human resource practices – which they (and we) refer to as 
internal labor markets (ILMs). The ILM concept provides a useful construct in which to 
frame the analysis. 
ILMs are generally characterized by long-term employment relationships, with 
most hiring done from within the firm for positions other than low-level “port-of entry” 
jobs. In firms with ILMs, wages are related to job characteristics and are relatively 
unresponsive to changes in the external labor market. Evidence supporting (though not 
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proving) the existence of ILMs includes the persistence of firm wage differentials over 
time, the extent of upward mobility and returns to seniority within firms, and limited 
external hiring other than at ports of entry. As described by Groshen and Levine (1998), 
numerous theories have been developed to explain why firms create internal labor 
markets. These models focus on the importance of firm-specific human capital, 
incentives and risk sharing as possible motivations.  
 Lazear and Oyer (2004) identify “ex post fluidity” as a key feature of internal 
labor markets where workers make decisions on employment and firms follow by 
adjusting internal human resource practices and organizational structure. The critical 
element is that firms adjust human resource practices and may change their ILM status in 
response to competitive conditions. Fairris (2004) suggests that firms choose their ILM 
status and these choices influence workforce quality at the firm, including the quit rate.  
While food stores are generally not known for innovative or high-performance human 
resources practices (Ben-Ner, Kong and Bosley, 1999), there is some case study evidence of 
variation in human resource practices across firms in this industry. In 2006, for example, 
Fortune magazine’s list of the top 100 companies to work for included several supermarket 
chains, with Wegmans Food Markets and Whole Foods Markets ranked in the top twenty. 
For some firms facing increased product market competition, customer service is seen as an 
important competitive edge, and long-term employment relationships may improve 
productivity and support the development of ILMs. Some food retailers have expanded the 
range of specialized services they offer, including more labor- and training-intensive services 
such as bakeries, delis, prepared food items and other services (Warner 2005). The historical 
high rate of unionization in supermarkets (relative to other types of retail) also suggests the 
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existence of ILMs in parts of the industry. Thus, the limited evidence available suggests that 
there is heterogeneity in the wage and ILM structure in the retail food industry, and that 
individual firms may respond only sluggishly to changes in the external market.  
Data and measurement 
 
The data used in this study are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal 
Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) database that matches workers with employers. 
This database includes quarterly records of the earnings of almost all individuals from the 
unemployment insurance systems of most U.S. states starting in the 1990s. This study 
uses a subset of seven states (California, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, North Carolina, 
Oregon and Washington) that have sufficient years of longitudinal data. These data have 
been extensively described elsewhere (e.g., Abowd et al., 2005). 
For this study the LEHD data were matched with additional information on both 
firms and workers. Worker characteristics include date of birth, place of birth, race, and 
sex. Data from the 1997 and 2002 Economic Census include establishment characteristics 
such as payroll, sales and product line. We also include controls for local economic 
conditions from Bureau of Economic Analysis data on per capita income, county 
population, and employment density. 
The geocoded LEHD data allow us to construct detailed establishment-specific 
measures of concentration and competition for the retail food industry. Measures of 
concentration and competition are created based on a five-mile radius around the 
longitude and latitude of each establishment’s location (see Davis et al., 2005 for more 
details). We calculate both sales-based four firm concentration ratios (CR-4) and 
Herfindahl indices on an establishment-specific basis. The CR-4 in this case represents 
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the share of sales in a given region, all of which have area 25*π, accounted for by the top 
four firms in that area (excluding the sales of the establishment itself). The Herfindahl 
index represents the sum of the squares of sales shares in each region.  Measures of threat 
from outside the industry are derived in a similar fashion. The number, employment, 
sales, and payroll of mass merchandisers are calculated within each grocery-store specific 
5-mile circle. A key innovation of this paper is that the measures are establishment 
specific and are not limited by arbitrary administratively defined geographic boundaries 
such as counties. 
Internal labor markets and human resource practices in supermarkets 
Following Lazear and Oyer (2004), we employ measures of promotion, hiring, 
and wage setting in order to capture key aspects of human resource practices of 
supermarkets. For promotion practices, we measure the proportion of workers hired into 
the second quintile that move to a higher quintile in five years and the wage growth of 
workers starting in the second quintile over the five-year time span.1 Hiring patterns are 
captured by the churning rates2 of all full-quarter workers in the establishment as well as 
by the proportion of accessions in the fifth and fourth earnings quintile within the firm. 
The pattern of wage setting is captured by the mean and standard deviation of log real 
                                                 
1 Much of the supermarket workforce is part-time and transitional by choice, with a smaller percentage of 
career retail food workers appearing in the data. We address this issue by focusing on full quarter workers, 
as well as examining the promotion and wage growth of workers who have earnings that are in the second 
and higher quintiles of the firm wage distribution, rather than the bottom quintile. The sample includes all 
establishments classified as grocery stores (SIC 54111) that have at least 15 full-quarter workers and 30 
flow workers. Flow employment accounts for all workers employed by the firm at any time during the 
quarter, while full quarter employment measures all workers who were employed on either a part time or 
full time basis by the employer for the full quarter. The earnings measures reflect quarterly earnings 
without any adjustment for the number of hours worked during the quarter. There is no information on 
hours or weeks worked or the duration of employment within the quarter in the database. 
2 Churning is defined as accessions plus separations minus net job flows divided by employment. 
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earnings for full quarter workers in the firm, as well as by measures of earnings 
dispersion for full quarter workers. 
Given the high correlation of these measures across establishment (with the 
exception of worker wage growth) we employ cluster analysis to classify the 
supermarkets into one of two groups, which for convenience we call ILM and non-ILM. 
The clustering strategy uses non-hierarchical clustering based upon the median value of 
the measures in each of the groups. The measures capture hiring, wage setting, and 
promotion practices and include measures of worker churning, mean earnings, the 
standard deviation of earnings, and the ratio of flow to full quarter workers. The 
clustering is done on pooled 1997 and 2002 data.  
Table 1 (columns one and two) list 2002 summary statistics for firms identified as 
ILM or non-ILM based on the cluster analysis. By construction, the ILM and non-ILM 
firms differ greatly across the variables included in the cluster analysis. The pattern of the 
variables in the two clusters is consistent with ILM theory and reflects the high 
correlation among these measures. The ILM firms have significantly lower churning 
rates, higher average earnings, higher standard deviation of earnings, and a higher share 
of full quarter workers relative to flow employment. The measures of promotion, hiring, 
and wage growth clearly illustrate the diversity of human resource practices across 
supermarkets. In addition, the stores identified as ILM or non-ILM differ on other 
measures as well (not shown). Firms that are classified as ILM promote a larger portion 
of their workers into higher earnings quintiles, have stronger average within-firm 
earnings growth, and tend to promote from within rather than hire outside the firm to fill 
higher-earning positions.  
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The LEHD data provide universe data on both workers and firms and enable us to 
directly measure the diversity of different aspects of human resource practices at the 
establishment level. They do not, however, directly capture other measures commonly 
used to describe human resource practices, notably training opportunities and incentive 
pay structures. In order to validate the LEHD-based summary index, we incorporated 
information from an external survey, the Supermarket Panel survey conducted by The 
Food Industry Center at the University of Minnesota. The Supermarket Panel Survey is 
conducted at the store level and typically completed by the store manager (King, 
Jacobson and Seltzer, 2002). We use the 2002 Supermarket Panel Survey to construct an 
human resources (HR) practices index based on five store level indicators: training hours 
for new cashiers; hours of training for store managers, grocery department managers, and 
scanning coordinators; the proportion of full-time employees hired at the store; and two 
measures of the use of incentive-based compensation and non-cash compensation at the 
store.3 These kinds of practices (more training, more full-time employment, and more 
incentive-based compensation) suggest a human resources environment emphasizing the 
development of firm-specific human capital and designed to reduce turnover.  
To create the index, each store was ranked as to whether it was above or below 
the mean (calculated from the survey data) for each of the five measures. If the store was 
above the mean on at least three of the measures, it was coded as a high HR store. About 
one-third of the stores in the Supermarket Panel survey were ranked “high” according to 
                                                 
3 There are nine indicators of incentive based and non-cash compensation in the survey, including the 
issuance of annual bonuses, individual performance incentive pay, incentive pay based on product or 
category performance, an employee stock ownership plan, individual health insurance, family health 
insurance, disability insurance, a company funded pension plan, and a 401(k) plan. From the survey, we 
count the number of indicators that are typically part of the compensation of both full-time personnel and 
part-time personnel. This is consistent with the definition of an ILM in which benefits accrue to jobs and 
not individuals within the firm. 
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this index. Using this index as a guide, we then categorized major supermarket chains 
into three groups: those at the high end of the HR scale, those at the low end, and those 
that exhibited a high range of variability from one store location to another. While there 
was a degree of subjectivity in this categorization, use of case study and industry 
knowledge helped to inform the process.4
Table 1 (columns three and four) compare the LEHD measures for firms 
categorized based on the Supermarket Panel as having high and low HR practices (those 
in the mid-range are excluded from the table). These results show the expected 
consistency with the LEHD-based classification into ILM and non-ILM categories. The 
high and low HR stores show similar patterns as seen in columns one and two, though the 
differences between the two groups are generally smaller. In particular, the firms with a 
low score on the HR practices index as measured in the Supermarket Panel Survey have 
significantly higher churning rates, lower mean earnings and less wage dispersion than do 
firms identified as having a higher HR practices index score. 
Comparing the high and low rankings based on the Supermarket Panel 
categorization to the ranking of these stores based on the LEHD measures of ILMs, we 
find a considerable degree of consistency despite the use of different data and measures 
of HR practices. In 2002, 77% of firms identified as having high HR practices based on 
the Supermarket survey were identified as being ILM firms using the cluster analysis. 
Close to 60% of those firms marked as having low HR practices were designated as non-
                                                 
4 We considered other store-level organizational factors, such as membership in a self-distributing chain 
and unionization, but in the end did not include these in the HR index. Close to 50% of self-distributing 
stores (those in which stores and distribution centers are under common ownership) are high HR 
establishments while only 38% of wholesaler supplied stores pursue this strategy. In contrast, unionization 
did not seem closely related to the HR measure. The proportion of high HR stores is very similar across 
union and non-union stores in the survey. 
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ILM firms based on the cluster analysis. These results increase our confidence that the 
LEHD measures of ILMs are capturing important differences in store HR policies and 
practices. 
Supermarket Response to Competition from Mass Merchandisers 
Faced with growing competition from non-traditional food sellers, supermarkets 
have typically responded with changes in marketing and pricing, yet they may also alter 
employment and compensation strategies in an effort to adapt. In this section we analyze 
the impact of competition from mass merchandisers on two outcomes: the likelihood of 
firm exit and the probability of changing HR practices (from ILM to non-ILM or vice 
versa).  
Table 2 provides first a descriptive look at the patterns of HR changes and firm 
exit over time, breaking out establishments into those that faced a significant competitive 
threat (defined as having two or more mass merchandisers within five miles) and those 
who did not, and categorizing establishments into those classified as ILM and those 
classified as non-ILM. Based on the establishment level data, it is clear that individual 
establishments in the retail food industry do not appear to be rapidly adjusting human 
resource practices despite changes in the external environment. Even in the high threat 
areas, of those firms that did not exit by 2002, most remained either ILM or non-ILM: 
only about 11% switched HR practices based on the ILM categorization. Any differential 
response appears to have occurred on the entry/exit margin.  In the high threat areas, 341 
firms exited, of which 40% were ILM, and 269 entered, of which 43% were ILM.  In the 
low threat areas, a lower percentage of exiting establishments were ILM; of the 293 firms 
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that exited in low threat areas between 1997 and 2002, only 24% were ILM. Meanwhile, 
of the 180 that entered in low threat areas, 31% were ILM.  
While both ILM and non-ILM firms are more likely to exit the industry than 
change human resource practices, non-ILM firms pursue an exit rather than change 
strategy at a much higher rate than ILM firms – and this is particularly true in high threat 
areas.  In high threat areas, non-ILM firms are more than four times more likely to exit 
than change while ILM firms are just over twice as likely to record this outcome. In low 
threat areas, by contrast, non-ILM firms are still more than four times likely to exit than 
change while ILM firms are 1.5 times as likely to record this outcome. Given that an 
establishment does survive, the propensity to maintain the same HR policy over time is 
about the same for both ILM firms and non-ILM firms (near 80%).    
Empirical analysis and findings 
Human resource practices observed in the retail food industry show a significant 
amount of heterogeneity, though these practices also exhibit a large amount of 
persistence over time. In this section, we more closely examine the ways in which the 
labor market structure of the industry can change through establishments’ differential 
reactions to the changing competition while controlling for a variety of establishment 
specific factors. We first examine the effect of changing competitive conditions on firm 
exit using a probit model for the probability that an establishment observed in 1997 exits 
by 2002. The key independent variables are the number of mass merchandisers within a 
five-mile radius (measured in 1997) – which is the measure of competitive threat – and a 
dummy for whether the firm uses ILM human resource practices. Thus we can compare 
the impacts of mass merchandisers on grocery store exit and the differential effect of 
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mass merchandisers on ILM versus non-ILM grocery store establishments. Variables that 
control for other aspects of the competitiveness and size of the local product market 
include the 1997 four-firm concentration ratio of grocery stores, 1997 county per capita 
income, and 1997 county population. Establishment-level control variables include firm 
size and workforce composition (age, sex, education and citizenship).  
Table 3 presents the marginal effects from the probit regressions for firm exit. 
Focusing first on column 1, stores with greater numbers of mass merchandisers within a 
five-mile radius are more likely to exit while stores with ILM practices are less likely to 
exit. This important link between ILM structure and decreased probability of exit 
confirms other studies on supermarket performance. Furthermore, the large negative 
coefficient on ILM status is consistent with expectations, as ILM status is likely to be 
correlated with the age, multi-unit status, and overall economic performance of a grocery 
establishment. While the effect of mass merchandisers is relatively small, it is consistent 
with our expectations that competition from mass merchandisers adversely affects 
traditional grocery store survival. 
The second column adds an interaction between number of mass merchandisers 
nearby and ILM status. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant 
suggesting that grocery establishments with ILMs, relative to non-ILM grocery 
establishments, are more adversely affected by competition from mass merchandisers. 
The coefficient on mass merchandisers becomes insignificant while the coefficient on 
ILM status becomes larger. The size and significance of these first three coefficients 
remains constant as additional controls for local product market conditions and firm 
characteristics are added in the last two columns, despite the relatively small sample size. 
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 The overall results from the model are particularly informative given industry 
discussions about how to deal with emerging competition from mass merchandisers. 
Information from supermarket managers who faced early entry from mass merchandisers 
suggested a conservative strategy in adjusting labor practices. The Progressive Grocer 
noted that grocers who are “doing battle with supercenters tend to rely on tried-and-true 
weapons such as service and perishables” (Garry 1993). Competitive tactics such as 
expanding service departments, focusing on strong customer service, and putting more 
emphasis on the quality of perishables were mentioned by store managers as the best 
methods for competing against mass merchandisers and supercenters. These strategies 
rely on dedicated, long-term employees who are familiar with the longtime customers 
and have a commitment to service and are most effectively implemented with an ILM 
workforce. 
A second issue is to identify factors that influence changes in the internal labor 
structure of food retailers, restricting attention to establishments who remain in business 
from 1997 through 2002. This specification is restricted to food retailers identified as 
having an internal labor market in 1997and estimates the probability of switching from 
ILM to non-ILM status by 2002 using a probit model. Across all specifications presented 
in Table 4, the number of mass merchandisers located in the same market area as a food 
retailer had no statistically discernible impact on switching behavior (similarly, the 
number of mass merchandisers had no statistically significant correlation with switching 
from non-ILM to ILM status in a separate regression not shown). Food retailers with an 
ILM structure were significantly less likely to switch to a non-ILM structure when 
operated in a region with a high concentration ratio than if it operated in a region with a 
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low concentration ratio. A ten-percentage point increase in the CR-4 ratio is associated 
with a decrease in the probability of switching from ILM to non-ILM status of about four 
percentage points. This effect is apparent even when grocery store size is controlled for in 
the model, although the point estimate is reduced and statistical significance is at the 10% 
significance level. This result suggests that increases in the concentration ratio of grocery 
sales in a given region provide an insulating factor for food retailers to retain high 
performance human resource practices. Overall, however, the competitive presence of 
mass merchandisers does not appear to influence food retailers into switching either to or 
away from an ILM structure.   
Conclusion 
Technology, changing consumer preferences, and competition from non-
traditional food retailers like Wal-Mart have led to major changes in supermarket 
operations, pricing and supply chain strategies over the past decade. Several recent 
empirical studies suggest that Wal-Mart’s entry reduces employment and payroll in a 
county, yet the way in which an industry’s labor market adjusts in response to such 
competitive shocks is not clear. The evidence presented here suggests that there is 
considerable heterogeneity in human resource practices across retail food establishments, 
and these practices are quite persistent even in the face of new external competition. 
While individual establishments do not appear to change HR strategies rapidly, the local 
labor market may be impacted through the entry and exit of particular firms, rather than 
changes in strategies of existing firms. Establishments with ILMs as a whole are less 
likely to exit, yet ILM establishments are more likely than non-ILM establishments to 
exit in areas with increased competition from mass merchandisers. Our analysis of 
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matched employee-employer data finds that while HR practices are persistent among 
food retailers, local labor markets are likely to be impacted by entry of mass 
merchandisers through entry and exit of firms.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics on employment and pay practices of supermarkets 
 
2002 
 
Non-ILM 
 
ILM 
Low HR 
index 
High HR 
index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample size 1,781 1,242 82 188 
Churning rate 0.20 0.11** 0.14 0.10** 
Log mean earnings 8.27 8.79** 8.50 8.70** 
Log std. deviation of earnings 7.86 8.53** 8.28 8.47** 
Flow-to-full-quarter employment 
ratio 
1.62 1.35** 1.36 1.37 
 
Note: Columns one and two cluster stores based on LEHD measures. Columns 3 and 4 
group stores based on external survey data on human resource practices. 
**Difference between ILM (high HR index) and non-ILM (low HR index) is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Changes in ILM status of food stores in areas with high or low threat of 
competition from mass merchandisers 
 Number of 
establishments 
in 1997 
Did not change 
ILM status by 
2002 (%) 
Changed ILM 
status by 2002 
(%) 
Exited by 
2002  
(%) 
High-threat location     
     Non-ILM 462 44.6 11.5 43.9 
     ILM 537 62.9 11.3 25.7 
Low-threat location     
     Non-ILM 511 47.4 9.2 43.4 
     ILM 354 66.4 13.5 20.1 
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Table 3: Estimation results on the probability of firm exit (probit model) 
Marginal effects (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of mass 
merchandisers nearby 
0.0132*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0043 
(0.0062) 
0.0057 
(0.0062) 
0.0100 
(0.0076) 
ILM -0.2080*** 
(0.0214) 
-0.2586*** 
(0.0306) 
-0.2594*** 
(0.0307) 
-0.2172*** 
(0.0365) 
ILM * number of mass 
merchandisers 
 0.0168* 
(0.0090) 
0.0169* 
(0.0090) 
0.0166* 
(0.0093) 
Four-firm concentration ratio   0.0792* 
(0.0449) 
0.0465 
(0.0479) 
Controls for firm size and 
workforce composition and 
state dummy variables 
No No No Yes 
Observations 1,864 1,864 1,864 1,864 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects calculated including the Ai-
Norton (2003) correction for the magnitudes and standard errors of the interaction effects.   
*significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Estimation results on the probability of changing HR practices (probit 
model of switching from ILM to non-ILM) 
Marginal effects (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of mass 
merchandisers nearby 
0.0035 
(0.0067) 
0.0009 
(0.0066) 
0.0076 
(0.0067) 
-0.0200 
(0.0065) 
Four-firm concentration ratio  -0.1768*** 
(0.0636) 
-0.2126*** 
(0.0630) 
-0.0867* 
(0.0513) 
Log per capita income   -0.2730*** 
(0.0664) 
-0.2259*** 
(0.0659) 
Controls for firm size, 
workforce composition and 
state dummy variables 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Observations 668 668 668 668 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include controls for change in 
ownership and log of county population.  
*significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
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